A look at Israel and Iran
The Charlie Rose Show
2/4/2010 

HOST CHARLIE ROSE:  The Obama administration is at a critical point in its policy towards Iran.  Although it says the door is still open for negotiation, the administration is increasing pressure on the Iranian government.  In his state of the union address last week, President Obama appeared to take a tougher stance.  

[FILE VIDEO]

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  Diplomatic efforts have also strengthened our hand in dealing with those nations that
insist on violating international agreements in pursuit of nuclear weapons.   That's why North Korea now faces increased isolation and stronger sanctions - sanctions that are being vigorously enforced.   That's why the international community is more united and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated.  And as Iran's leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt, they, too, will face growing consequences.  That is a promise.  

[END OF FILE VIDEO]

HOST:  General David Petraeus, the top command in the region, has made rare public comments about defensive measures.  U.S. cruisers are now patrolling off the Iranian coast at all times.  At least four Arab countries have accepted the deployment of patriot antimissile systems.  

As the U.S. continues to rally international support for tougher U.N. sanctions, China has repeatedly stated its opposition.  The Israeli government is watching nervously, and the question of an Israeli strike on Iran continues to percolate.

Joining me to look at all of this:  Ethan Bronner, the Jerusalem Bureau Chief for "The New York Times;" Bret Stephens, the foreign affairs columnist at "The Wall Street Journal;" from Washington, Jeffrey Goldberg of "The Atlantic;" from Palo Alto, California, Professor Abbas Milani of Stanford University.  And I am pleased to have each of them here.  

And I will begin with Jeffrey Goldberg in Washington.  Where do you think the Obama Middle East policy and Gulf policy stands today?  

JEFFREY GOLDBERG, "THE ATLANTIC":  That's a very good question and it's a bit of a mystery to many people.  I think they're in transition.   They're in transition away from, let's say, an idealistic or hopeful mode to a kind of sober recognition that Iran might not want to play at all.   And therefore, we, the United States, are going to do everything possible to buttress our Arab allies in the region and buttress Israel as well, with the caveat, of course, that the Obama administration would at this point much rather see Israel not take military action against Iran.  

HOST:  Mitchell has been criticized because of the emphasis they put on settlements.  Other people say that he is doing a much better job than perceived and that he's on the job every day working hard.  What's your take, Jeffrey?  

GOLDBERG:  Oh, that's to me?  I think that there's a feeling in Washington that Mitchell hasn't succeeded at all.  There's a new push, of course, right now, to begin negotiations.  I think one of the things that's happened over the past year is that the administration, some key people in the administration, Rahm Emmanuel, Hillary Clinton, have a history with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and they were worried about his ability to come to the table ask come to negotiate.  

I think now there's been a shift, at least is what I'm hearing from talking to people, there's been a shift toward a recognition that Netanyahu is the only Israeli politician at this point who could deliver 70 or 80 percent of the Israeli public to a serious negotiation with the Palestinians.  So they're trying to recalibrate the way they understand him.  

I don't think anybody's particularly hopeful right now.  People are hopeful about, obviously, the Palestinian prime minister Salaam Fayyad and his willingness and confidence in building up what is the beginnings of a state on the West Bank.  But I don't think people are overly hopeful right now.  But of course they are going to make another push in the next couple months.  

HOST:  But you know Netanyahu well.  Tell me where you think where his head is.  

GOLDBERG:  His head is in Iran.  His head is on the Iran question.  There's no doubt about that.  And Ethan obviously is sitting in Jerusalem most of the time.  He knows this better than I do.  I think Netanyahu is very conscious of the fact that he can't alienate the Obama administration unduly with settlement building.  You know, we've  talked about this before.  Israel has a couple of key defense doctrines.  One of them is, obviously, to prevent adversaries who are neighbors for getting nuclear weapons.  We saw that with Iraq and Syria, obviously.  

Another core defense doctrine is never get on the wrong side of a president of the United States.  That's crucial.  You cannot alienate a president of the United States.  And right now, Netanyahu is trying - imperfectly, but I think he's trying - not to alienate this administration on settlements so that he can keep the focus on Iran.   But - of course this is a big "but" - Israel is a very vibrant and raucous democracy and he has constituencies that want to see rapid settlement expansion.  So he is in a little bit of a tough spot.  

HOST:  I assume the last time an Israeli prime minister was on the bad side of an American president was Shamir and Bush?  

GOLDBERG:  Shamir and Baker and Bush, right.  You remember that famous moment when Baker announced the White House phone number and told [indistinguishable] to call him if he was interested in peace.

HOST:  [Laughs]

GOLDBERG:  No, I think this is probably almost a more serious moment because this is really dealing with some existential issues for Israel.  I think, you know, you'd have to go back to Eisenhower in '56 to look at a situation as serious as the one that we have now.  

But yes, in the past, Israeli prime ministers have gotten on the wrong side of presidents.  And usually that means nothing good for the Israeli prime minister.  The Israeli public is very, very sensitive to - the voting public is very sensitive to America's needs and wants and desires in the Middle East.   What's different about this moment is you have a prime minister who seems to have alienated to some degree this administration, but the Israeli public got more behind that prime minister.  That's really never happened before.  That split has never really happened, which just shows you how seriously the Israeli public takes the threat from Iran.  

ETHAN BRONNER, "THE NEW YORK TIMES":  It's interesting when he talks about how the Israeli public went behind Netanyahu - and that's true - I think that's partly a result of the sense in Israel that - an increasing sense that the world out to get us, that somehow that Obama and his administration are part of a shift away from Israel.  That's the fear in Israel toward recalibration, toward of the Muslim world and the Arab world.   That was part of what led everyone in Israel to feel angry about it.   The result was that the Obama administration was simply unable to make Netanyahu and the government truly stop settlement building.  It was not a particularly intelligent policy choice to just announce it and not lay the groundwork for it.

And I think that Jeffrey is also right, that this government in Israel is not going to be building settlements in order to anger this administration.  But one thing that I do think may be going on is people building settlements without the permission of the government.  So the difficulty of monitoring this moratorium, this freeze, this pause, whatever you want to call it, is going to be enormous.  You have hundreds of thousands of settlers, and their whole goal in life is to settle.  Not all of them, but many of them.  

BRET STEPHENS, "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL":  The Israelis, from Netanyahu's point of view, they're in a pretty good place.  Because the larger issue is the unsettled state of Palestinian politics.  It's just unclear how things will play out between Hamas and Fatah, who the next leaders of Fatah are going to be and whether they're going to be credible leaders.  So you see Netanyahu constantly making the argument, I'm prepared to sit down, I'm prepared to talk without preconditions.  There are preconditions, but that's another story.  

He can make these sorts of gestures because there's some confidence that the Palestinian won't be able to reciprocate in a negotiation that's meaningful.  There were extensive talks between the previous prime minister, Olmert, and Mahmoud Abbas, and they ultimately went nowhere primarily because Abbas was just, for his own domestic reasons, unable to accept them.   So Netanyahu can now say to the administration, look, I'm making gestures, I've made a frozen settlement project for - what is it, 10 months - we're now about half way into that.  But at the end of the day, the question that Israelis -

HOST:  Frozen settlement projects on the West Bank.  

STEPHENS:  On the West Bank.  At the end of the day we don't know what kind of Palestine we're dealing with.  And until that question is answered, he doesn't really have to worry too much about the Palestinian question.  He can, as Jeff says, devote all of his energy to Iran, which is what primarily preoccupies Israeli minds.

HOST:  Go ahead, Ethan.

BRONNER:  I would say that's true, but it's also true that if he wants to influence the future of this Palestine by helping Abbas - at least that's certainly the broad American view - that's the only way to make sure that in that battle between Fatah and Hamas that Fatah actually ends up on top, is by helping Abbas and what's going on in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.  So it's hard for him to sit back and think that that's going to be good for his long-term goal.  On the other hand, I do think that he, like many people who are right of center in Israel, have mixed views about whether there really should be a Palestinian state.  And it's kind of like I'm willing to work toward getting there, but I'm also wondering if we don't get there, whether that won't ultimately benefit us.

STEPHENS:  You've just - quickly, one point, the view is that Netanyahu is the guy who can deliver.  But remember that in the election it wasn't Netanyahu who won.  It was the right that won.  Netanyahu actually didn't receive the largest - his party didn't receive the largest share of votes.  He won the premiership on the strength of the votes that went to Avigdor Lieberman and parties actually to the right.  So his room for maneuver, visavis, the Palestinians, is more limited than you might imagine.

HOST:  And what does Lieberman want him to do?

STEPHENS:  Lieberman wants him to think only about Iran.  I mean, Lieberman has complicated schemes.  These are the Palestinians, but what Lieberman would want is Palestine off the table.  

GOLDBERG:  Seems like today, Charlie, by the way, it seems like today Lieberman wants Israel to invade Syria.  But in any given week, Lieberman might want Israel to invade any number of countries.  

BRONNER:  And he was pulled back by the prime minister on that point.  

GOLDBERG:  Yes, he was, very strongly.  That's too serious to mess around with.  

HOST:  This is a moment in terms of where people really have to come to some sense of clarity about where we are with respect to Iran, meaning we being Israelis and Americans and policymakers who have to make decisions.  

STEPHENS:  Well, look, from the Israeli point of view, I think I have never seen such wall-to-wall unanimity among an ordinarily disputatious people, among Israelis' in the view toward Iran.  There's no question that I think there's a consensus that Iran has to be dealt with.  

The real question that Israelis ask themselves is whether they're capable of doing it themselves.  That's why Israel has been playing a kind of Crazy Charlie game with the west, particular with the Obama administration, publicizing large-scale aerial maneuvers, flying planes out all the way to Gibraltar to basically telegraph to the Obama administration, you had better do something about this.  You had better put the Iranians to a fundamental choice, that they can either keep their regime, or have a bomb, or we're going to take action on our own.  And the consequences of that are difficult to foresee, but certainly very difficult for the United States.  

And among American calculations it's not simply what to do about Iran, but are they prepared to pay the price of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran that would have consequences for American interests in the Gulf.  You saw the patriot batteries being installed in Afghanistan where Iran has ties with the Taliban in Iraq, in particular where we're trying to wind things down, but Iran remains a player of influence there.  

So that's what - the Israeli strategy has been to tell the Obama administration, think carefully, don't neglect us as players in this and don't neglect our interests, because we have an ability to affect yours.  

HOST:  And is it your sense that if the United States cannot do something where they have sanctions at work, or whatever its options are, that the Israelis will certainly act?  
STEPHENS:  I think there are people who take a different view.  I have been arguing that not only will Israelis act, but I think Israelis will act sooner rather than later.  Time does not play into their hands here.  

HOST:  What's the principal reason you believe that, sooner rather than later?  

STEPHENS:  The sooner they strike, the more likely it is in that they can strike effectively.  The longer they delay, the more enriched uranium the Iranians will have, the more widely they will be able to disburse it, the more capable their defenses will become.  

So because time is not on Israel's side and because we're at this moment where the diplomacy has been given its nine months to succeed, seems to have failed fairly decisively, this would be the kind of window in which, - at least outside of the technical issues of the military strike - Israel would have a strategic opportunity to act.  

HOST:  Abbas, give us the perspective as you think it is from Tehran?  

ABBAS MILANI, STANFORD UNIVERSITY:  Well, I can give you the perspective that I see both from the Iranian people, from the Iranian democratic movement.  And I think that there's a consensus inside Iran's democratic movement that this regime today is facing the most serious fundamental crisis in its 30-year history.  

Almost nothing can save this regime.  But there is one thing that I think will save it, and that would be an Israeli attack.  That's why I think people like Ahmadinejad, even Khamenei would very much be happy if they are attacked by Israel.  Because in my view, their goal in having the nuclear program has been all along the goal for going a nuclear bomb has been all along, in my view, to consolidate their own hold on power.  

I think they are trying to stay, as they have shown now, in power with - at any price, and it is becoming increasingly clear that they cannot.  But if Israel attacks, not only will there be widespread, I think, instability throughout the region, but I think this regime will be saved.  And I don't think saving this regime is in the long-term interest of Israel.  

HOST:  But before - I want you to continue, please, but are you saying that if, in fact, there is no attack from Israel and there is nothing hostile other than sanctions, that this regime will fall of its own weight because of its internal conflicts?  

MILANI:  That is very much my guess, absolutely.  If there are increased targeted sanctions against the regime, if they are increasingly isolated on the international arena, if it is made clear by the international community that the democratic movement has the support of the world, if China is forced to give up its rather unsavory support of this regime at any price, and I think China can be forced to do that.  

China has shown to be susceptible to pressures and people are beginning to put pressure.  There was just this statement that was signed by hundreds of Iran's academicians asking China to give up this strange behavior.  With these constellation of programs, I think there can be very serious hope there will be democracy in Iran.  

What I wanted to add is that you have to figure Turkey in this equation as well.  And I think Turkey's increasingly critical view toward Israel will become even more serious if such an attack takes place.  

BRONNER:  What I wanted to say is I think Abbas's point is a very powerful one.  And while I think that Bret was more right before the election, he is a little less right, and I think that the Israelis do recognize what Abbas is saying.   They watch a series of things that are developing, ticking clocks, as they like to say.  One is the amount of low-enriched uranium they can produce.  Another is what's going on internally.  Another is their own ability to withstand any kind of counterattack from Hezbollah or Hamas.  And the other is Iran's ability to withstand an attack from them.  

These are sort four ticking clocks that when I talk to Israeli military intelligence people they talk about.  And my sense is that things have shifted slightly; A, because they believe the Americans have grown more inpatient.  The world generally has become less believing in the ability to negotiate with the Iranians.  And they see that there could conceivably be some internal collapse that would allow them not to attack.  Because I think that they don't - my gut is that they know that attacking could unleash an enormous fireball of problems that they can't foresee and they can't necessarily stop.  

So while they want, you know, if you were to slap a slogan on Israel, it would be "never again" and they don't want that regime to have a nuclear weapon.  I don't think they want to be the ones to stop it.  They want the Americans to stop it.  

STEPHENS:  Well, I hope Abbas is right.  But the real question is, I mean, this regime could collapse in a year or it could collapse 20 years from now.  I remember in the early 1990s people said North Korea is certainly finished.  Right?  And it's remarkable the extent to which it has succeed in holding on.  The Junta in Burma has been around for decades, despite every kind of pressure.  

That has to weigh on Israel's calculations as well, because as much as it is in their long-term interest to see the regime fail and collapse and to go back to the kind of arrangement they had with the Shah where Israel practically had diplomatic relations, as interested as they are in that, they're even more interested in making sure Iran doesn't get a bomb.  

GOLDBERG:  Charlie, let me just make this one point contra Bret a little bit.  One of the things that the Israelis are worried about, and I have to attach myself to Ethan's analysis on this one.  One of the things that they're worried about is that an attack by them on Iran would unleash attacks on American troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.  And that for Israel is a kind of doomsday scenario.  Israel cannot survive, it certainly cannot flourish in a world in which the U.S. is blaming Israel for American soldiers' deaths.  

And I really think that because of that, among other things, the brakes are on a little bit more than Bret might have you believe.  The brakes are on a little bit in terms of the Israeli rush to bomb Iran.  

STEPHENS:  Well, I mean, look, we're obviously talking about the future. The future is very hard to predict.  It seems to me that if - I mean, and you have to question the rationality of the Iranian regime.  But in the event of an Israeli strike, what is Iran's interest in then involving Americans in acquiring a second enemy beyond the Israeli ones?  It doesn't seem to me to make sense from their point of view to bring in the United States one way or the other.  

GOLDBERG:  But not a lot of what they do makes sense, so we have to sort of factor that in.  

STEPHENS:  Well, there is a kind of rationality.  If you set aside the millenarianism and the brutality, there is a kind of calculating rationality to the regime.  So they would have to think very carefully before they embarked on those kinds of actions of picking a fight not only with one powerful regional neighbor, but then picking a fight with the world's premier superpower.  

So, I mean, let me just emphasize I'm not advocating an Israeli strike.  I think Israel would devoutly wish to find ways to avoid that scenario.  It's an extremely difficult one for them.  It raises all kinds of imponderable questions.  I'm just suggesting that, from Israel's point of view, they can't simply afford to wait 40 years, possibly, to wait for this regime to collapse.  It took -  improbable regimes have lasted longer.  

HOST:  But the judgment is not 40 years, I assume, if there is some pressure on the regime to collapse.  Abbas?  

MILANI:  Well, first of all, the regime doesn't need to directly take on U.S. soldiers in the region.  The regime has proxies that it can increase its help to and have them pick a fight and make life much more difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan, make life difficult for the U.S. in Iraq.  And I have no doubt they will do that.   I'm not sure that Hezbollah, for example, will ever pick a fight with Israel just for the sake of Iran, but they might even be pressuring Hezbollah to do that.  

But I think that the problem with this discussion is that it is trying to find a good solution.  There is no good solution.  There are simply bad and worse solutions.  And amongst these bad and worse solutions, the single worst is attacking Iran, because if you truly want this regime to stay for 30 years, have Israel attack it.  

HOST:  Let me give you a good solution, Abbas.  

GOLDBERG:  The Charlie Rose plan.  

[Laughter heard.]

HOST:  Well, wait until you hear it.  

GOLDBERG:  Oh, no, no.  I'm not - I'm eagerly awaiting.  I am.  

HOST:  I think that Dennis Blair said to the Congress when they all went down there that you have to judge Iran's nuclear decision making as being guided by some cost-benefit approach.  So, I mean, can we imagine circumstances in which this regime, because of all of its problems, says we need to back off on this and we need to give up?  

GOLDBERG:  That's very smart and rational.  That's very smart and rational.  But what's also smart and rational is the Iranian observation that the surest way to get America off its back is to be decisively nuclear. 

HOST:  Right.

GOLDBERG:  I mean, this is -

HOST:  Oh, that's a North Korean scenario.  

GOLDBERG:  You know, once they get - what did they learn from Iraq?   They learned that Iraq was invaded by America because Saddam didn't have nuclear weapons.  If Iraq had been a proven nuclear power, I'm not sure that the 2003 invasion would have happened. 

STEPHENS:  And this raises the question that we were debating with Abbas.  Because if Iran does become a nuclear power or a threshold nuclear power, what kind of lease on life does that give the regime?  One imagines that at least the Iranian leadership thinks that it would extend it significantly, would give it prestige, it would give it regional influence that it doesn't currently enjoy.

HOST:  So the green movement would just fall away because they have a nuclear weapon and therefore had new prestige? 

STEPHENS:  I don't think anyone around this table can say.  But I think it's a normal - it would be a rational calculation by the Iranians to think that their hand in the long-term is strengthened, not weakened, by possession of a bomb.

BRONNER:  There's one other thing, which is that -

HOST:  Go ahead, Abbas.  Go ahead - Hold on one second.  Let Ethan first and then you, Abbas.

BRONNER:   One thing I would say is that the move towards sanctions, even without China aboard - again, I'm just offering what Israelis tell me they believe - is encouraging.  They think that the economy in Iran is genuinely weak and that biding
sanctions can make a big difference.  And again, that would add to the scenario of the regime not surviving long-term.  It could make it more difficult and delay their development of nuclear weapons.  

So, I mean, I don't think it's a binary choice.  I think there is a feeling right now of kind of going six months by six months.  And I would be surprised if in the coming six months your scenario played out, that there would be an attack.  I think that they are actually pretty happy to wait and to push right now.  

HOST:  Abbas, go ahead, and then I have a question for you.  

MILANI:  I mean, if you look at the dynamics of the situation, Israel has an ally in the Iranian democratic movement in the sense that they don't want this regime to have a nuclear bomb.  Because they realize that if this regime, if Khamenei gets his hand on the bomb, he has gotten himself a lease on life.   And the economy is in shambles.  I mean, some of the reports that have come out only the last week show the incredible collapse of the real estate market.  For example, in Tehran there are reports that in Tehran real estate prices have come down 40 percent.  The price of the dollar in the black market has increased by 50 percent.  There is virtually no investment in any field.  The situation cannot continue.  

And what will again make everything a new ball game would be an attack on Iran.  I understand Israel is concerned, but I think they have to look at it from the point of view that we have to find the least damaging option.  And I think that is certainly not a military attack.  

HOST:  Should the president of the United States on Monday make a speech in which he says - or tomorrow, make a speech in which he says to the Iranian government in a speech to some group in Washington, we cannot - you cannot do this.  You cannot continue to suppress the people the way you are and you cannot continue to have these hangings in Tehran the way you're doing.  

STEPHENS:  Or else.  

HOST:  Or else.  And then the problem is, what's 'or else.'

STEPHENS:  What's the else?  

HOST:  Yes.  

MILANI:  Absolutely it can. 

HOST:  Well, I think he's saying -

MILANI:  As it told the government of South Africa.  

HOST:  Right.  So, okay, then, let me go around here.  Should he do that?   Even if he doesn't have 'or else,' should he try to ratchet up the international pressure rhetorically?  

STEPHENS:  I think he has to put the regime to a fundamental choice.  It can either survive as a regime or they can continue to pursue a nuclear weapon.   That's the only diplomatic strategy which I think might force the people in Tehran, the leadership in Tehran, to make the right decision at least as far as the rest of the world.  But this becomes the same probable that George Bush had in the run up to the Iraq war.  You can't say 'or else' and not mean or else.  

HOST:  Jeffrey is absolutely right about that.   But, I mean, you can try to be much more forceful.  I think the regime has been - the American president has been remarkably restrained in terms of what he has said to be critical and to be even engaged by the conflict in Iran.  

GOLDBERG:  Well, Charlie, can I just say that historically - look, we, the Americans, have not been very good at lining up on the side of the Iranian people over the last 40 or 50 or 60 years.  It's probably time to say, look, we stand with Iranians who want to be free.  I think, you know, when history looks back on this period, I think Obama will be seen better by history for having taken a strong stand for democracy and for freedom for the Iranian people.  I think there's no doubt about that.  

HOST:  Thank you all.  Thank you.  It's been great to have you here.  Good to see you again.  Thank you, Jeff.  Thank you, Abbas.   We will be right back.  
**************************

Speaker interjections not contributing to context may have been excluded from this transcription.
©Material supplied by Moba Media may be used for internal review, analysis or research only.  Any editing, reproduction, publication, rebroadcast, public showing or public display is forbidden and is prohibited by the copyright laws.

"US Pushes for New Sanctions Against Iran

International pressure for new sanctions against Iran is growing after Tehran announced more moves to expand nuclear fuel production and enrichment plants. The United States, France and Israel led calls for what would be a fourth set of sanctions against Iran. The Pentagon said the United States wanted a UN Security Council resolution on Iran 'within weeks' over its nuclear program. On Monday Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency said Iran was forced to decide to begin refining uranium to a higher level by international powers who for months ignored the country’s proposal on fuel swap.

Ali Asghar Soltanieh: 'We have been waiting for months about our proposal. One thing in brief and in conclusion is, there was a common element in both proposals. The common element was that Iran was ready to send equivalent required material out and receive the fuel simultaneously. They should have appreciated this concession by Iran. And we didn’t want, in fact, to produce it ourselves. Otherwise we should have started eight months ago, because we are master of enrichment technology. They forced us to choose this option. They should be blamed, those who totally ignored for the last nine months or most.'" - DemocracyNow 2/9/10